

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

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EXDIS

DEPT PASS: JCS WASHDC IMMEDIATE

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PCAT, PARM, UR, US
SUBJECT: US-SOVIET CAT: SUMMARY OF JULY 21 PLENARY

REF: HELSINKI 2297

BEGIN SUMMARY. MENDELEVICH STATED THAT HIS SIDE WAS NOT PREPARED TO TABLE MILITARY/TECHNICAL (M/T) COUNTER-PROPOSALS OR TO DO ANYTHING EXCEPT "DISCUSS" REGIONAL QUESTIONS AT THIS ROUND. ON THE OTHER HAND, HE AGREED ON THE NEED TO ESTABLISH COMMON GROUND ON THE MIL-TECH CRITERIA AND MOVED DISCUSSION OF SUBSTANCE OF THESE CRITERIA FORWARD. SOME OF MENDELEVICH'S PRESENTATION WAS SCHIZOPHRENIC. HE STATED FRANK CRITICISM OF US POLICIES AND MOTIVES IN AFRICA AND SAID THAT IF WE INSISTED ON AGREEMENT ON OUR REGIONAL PROPOSALS PRIOR TO AGREEMENT ON CRITERIA, WE WOULD HAVE TO TREAT THE PROPOSALS AS SEPARATE FROM THOSE NEGOTIATIONS JUST AS THEIR NEIGHBORS PROPOSAL IS SEPARATE. BUT AT THE SAME TIME, HE HAD A POSITIVE REACTION TO FOUR OF OUR MIL-TECH CRITERIA AND INDICATING A STRONG DESIRE TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THESE AS WELL AS POLITICAL/LEGAL (P/L) CRITERIA IN DUE COURSE. HOW MUCH OF THE NEGATIVE VIBRATIONS WERE PURE TACTICS OR EXPEC-

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TED SOVIET SLOWNESS IN COMING TO GRIPS WITH THIS PROBLEM OR MEANT FOR INTERNAL CONSUMPTION OR SERIOUS FUNDAMENTAL DOUBTS IS MUCH TOO EARLY TO TELL. END SUMMARY.

1. TO BEGIN THE US PRESENTATION, GELB TABLED THE DRAFT PROGRAM FOR COOPERATION (REFTEL), EMPHASIZING US FLEXIBILITY IN CONSIDERING ANY CHANGES THE SOVIET SIDE

MIGHT WISH TO PROPOSE. GELB THEN WALKED THE SOVIET SIDE THROUGH THE M/T CRITERIA. HE ARGUED THAT A PRACTICAL RELATIONSHIP EXISTED BETWEEN THE P/L CRITERIA AND THE M/T CRITERIA. THE ESSENCE OF THE PRESENTATION WAS THAT THE M/T CRITERIA WERE IN OUR COMMON INTEREST AND THAT THE SOVIETS MUST USE SOME CRITERIA LIKE OUR OWN IN REACHING ARMS TRANSFERS DECISIONS. GELB REPEATEDLY ASKED THE SOVIETS WHETHER THEIR CRITERIA WERE THE SAME AS OURS OR, IF NOT, HOW THEY WERE DIFFERENT. FINALLY, GELB ILLUSTRATED US ARMS TRANSFER DECISIONMAKING BY REFERRING TO THE A-7 CASE FOR PAKISTAN.

2. MENDELEVICH BEGAN HIS INITIAL PRESENTATION BY FAVORABLY CHARACTERIZING THE US DRAFT PAPER ON M/T CRITERIA, NOTING THAT IT EVOKED A LOT OF QUESTIONS AND THIS WAS HOW NEGOTIATIONS WERE CARRIED OUT. AS FOR REGIONAL ASPECTS, "COMMON SENSE" REQUIRED THAT WE FIRST AGREE ON P/L AND M/T CRITERIA. IF THE US SIDE INSISTED ON REACHING PRIOR AGREEMENT ON REGIONS, THEIR PROPOSALS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED SEPARATELY, JUST AS THE SOVIET NEIGHBORS PROPOSAL. OTHERWISE, WE COULD OBSERVE THE PRINCIPLE OF PARALLEL WORK IN ALL AREAS.

3. MENDELEVICH SAID THE DETERMINATION OF REGIONAL BALANCE MUST TAKE THE QUESTION OF RELATIVE POLITICAL/ SOCIAL SYSTEMS INTO CONSIDERATION. CHANGES IN SOCIAL
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STRUCTURE COULD CHANGE THE PARAMETERS OF THE BALANCE, WHICH EXPLAINED SOVIET ARMS AID TO PERU. THIS CONSIDERATION MEANT THE PROBLEM WAS MORE DIFFICULT THAN JUST P/L AND M/T CRITERIA AND THE DETERMINATION OF THE FRAMEWORK OF A BALANCE WAS SUBJECTIVE AND DIFFICULT. PERHAPS SALT WAS THE ONLY EXAMPLE OF OBJECTIVE CALCULATION.

4. REGARDING M/T, MENDELEVICH NOTED THE USSR ALSO HAD TURNED DOWN VARIOUS ARMS REQUESTS IN QUANTITIES DESIRED AND IN CERTAIN TYPES. HE SAID SOVIETS COULD ACCEPT BASIS OF M/T CRITERIA NUMBERS 1, 2, 3, AND 7; NUMBER 4 NEEDED CAREFUL WORK; NUMBER 3 REQUIRED EXPLANATION AS TO DEFINITION OF TERRORISTS; AND NUMBERS 5 AND 6 HAD TO BE CONSIDERED ALONG LINES HE HAD TAKEN RE DETERMINING MILITARY BALANCE. AS FOR CRITERION 8, MENDELEVICH SAID SOVIETS RESOLUTELY OBJECTED SINCE IT CONTRADICTED PROFOUNDLY THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF SOVIET POLICY. FINALLY, HE ASKED FOR AND RECEIVED CLARIFICATION AS TO WHICH SECURITY PARTNERS, ETC. WOULD BE EXEMPT FROM CRITERIA.

5. IN HIS RESPONSE TO MENDELEVICH, GELB SAID THAT

MENDELEVICH'S COMMENT ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF MOVING FORWARD ON CONCRET REGIONAL STEPS WITHOUT FINAL AGREEMENT ON CRITERIA WAS UNFORTUNATE FOR THE FUTURE OF OUR WORK. AT THE SAME TIME, HE POINTED OUT THERE WERE SOME HOPEFUL SIGNS ON A NUMBER OF M/T CRITERIA WHERE THE APPROACH INDICATED BY THE SOVIETS WAS SIMILAR TO OURS. GELB STRESSED THE SOVIETS HAD NOTHING TO LOSE BY ENCOURAGING AN INCIPIENT ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVE, SUCH AS THAT IN LATIN AMERICA. REGARDING AFRICA, HE MADE THE POINT AGAIN THAT THE CONTINENT WAS AT A CROSSROADS: IF THE SOVIETS DID MORE, WE WOULD DO MORE; IF THEY DID LESS WE WOULD DO LESS. IN CONCLUDING HIS REBUTTAL, GELB MADE TWO POINTS: (1) FRANKNESS ABOUT POLICY WAS IMPORTANT, AND (2) IT WAS NECESSARY TO DO THIS DIFFICULT WORK WHICH
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WAS IN OUR COMMON INTEREST.

6. MENDELEVICH EMPHASIZED THAT SOCIAL REVOLUTION AND NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS WERE AN INTEGRAL PART OF SOVIET POLICY IN GENERAL. AS FOR ACTION ON LATIN AMERICA, THE SOVIETS DID PREFER PEACEFUL SOLUTIONS OVER CONFLICT, BUT DISTRUSTED US BEHAVIOR IN AFRICA. SOVIETS HELPED NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS WHEN ASKED FOR HELP BUT THIS DID NOT MEAN THEY WERE AGAINST PEACEFUL SOLUTIONS.

7. IN CONCLUSION, GELB LANDED VERY HARD ON MENDELEVICH FOR SOVIET UNPREPAREDNESS TO GO FURTHER ON M/T CRITERIA IN VIEW OF THE FACT THE SOVIET SIDE KNEW WHAT TO EXPECT AT THIS ROUND. HOWEVER, GELB GAVE MENDELEVICH AN OPENING TO CHANGE HIS MIND ABOUT TABLING M/T COUNTERPROPOSALS LATER IN THE ROUND. END. RIDGEWAY

NOTE BY OCT: ABOVE ADDRESSEE NOT PASSED.

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